Open Source Android Vulnerability Detection Tools: A Survey by Kulkarni, Keyur & Javaid, Ahmad Y
 Open Source Android Vulnerability Detection 
Tools: A Survey
 
Abstract—Since last decade, smartphones have become an 
integral part of everyone’s life. Having the ability to handle many 
useful and attractive applications, smartphones sport flawless 
functionality and small sizes leading to their exponential growth. 
Additionally, due to the huge user base and a wide range of 
functionalities, these mobile platforms have become a popular 
source of information to the public through several Apps provided 
by the DHS Citizen Application Directory. Such wide audience to 
this platform is also making it a huge target for cyber- attacks. 
While Android, the most popular open source mobile platform, 
has its base set of permissions to protect the device and resources, 
it does not provide a security framework to defend against any 
attack. This paper surveys threat, vulnerability and security 
analysis tools, which are open source in nature, for the Android 
platform and systemizes the knowledge of Android security 
mechanisms. Additionally, a comparison of three popular tools is 
presented. 
Keywords— mobile security, malware analysis, Android, static 
analysis 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the modern world, smartphones have become a necessity 
for everyone. Late 1990s saw a growth in use of PDAs (personal 
digital assistant) and it did not take much time to transform 
them into mobile devices, popularly known as smartphones. 
With abilities of PCs, these devices offer numerous appealing 
features such as connectivity (GPRS, LTE, GSM, Bluetooth, 
NFC), multi-tasking, storage, fingerprint sensor, wireless 
charging, and beautiful graphical user interface. It is estimated 
that subscription of smartphones to increase to 2.5 billion in 
2017. Recent years has seen a huge development in mobile 
device operating systems such as Android, iOS, BlackBerry and 
Windows Mobile. It is well know that Android - an open access 
OS developed by Google - has seen huge demand in recent 
years and has a market share of roughly 87.5%. Android being 
an open-source technology, it is not only limited to 
smartphones, but it has extended its reach to TV, car and 
automation systems. These devices are now the ideal target for 
attackers because of the huge user base and lack of presence of 
several security features. The number of application developers 
increases day by day, however, many of them lack expertise for 
security implementations. Many developers focus on 
consumers demand rather than security of the application. 
Mobile security is an emerging area of research. The past 2-
3 years have seen many research works of mobile security not 
only related to Android but also iOS. The openness and 
extensibility of Android have made it a popular platform for 
mobile devices and a strong candidate to drive the Internet-of-
Things. After some research, researchers have presented some 
good security frameworks. These frameworks have either static 
or dynamic approaches. The main advantage of these 
approaches is that it does not require any changes to the 
Android code, and the hardening tools can be easily deployed 
as standard applications on the device. 
According to Kaspersky Security Bulletin 2016 [1], most 
hazardous and well-known mobile Trojans were advertising 
Trojans. These Trojans were able to use superuser rights on 
infected device. Kaspersky Lab, in October 2015 detected a 
Trojan, which looked like a music player application but used 
for stealing users credentials. In 2016, ransom Trojans were 
also popularly used by cybercriminals. These Trojans like 
Trojan-Ransom.AndroidOS.Fusob, were distributed in 
countries like United States, Germany and United Kingdom and 
usually demanded ransom between 100$ or 200$, to unblock 
device. In China another ransom family, Trojan-
Ransom.AndroidOS.Congur, blocks infected device in a unique 
way. Once started, it will ask for Device Administrators rights 
and then changes pin code or sets one if not set before. 
Cybercriminals will ask user to contact them through QQ 
messenger to get new pin code. New category of Trojan seem 
to be immersed in 2016, which will attack the routers 
controlling wireless network. This malware (also known as 
Switcher) aims at attacking the router’s admin access using 
long, predefined list of login ids and passwords. If successful, 
the attackers will change Domain Name Servers (DNS) settings 
in order to re-route DNS query. Hence, the attacker will be able 
to monitor network traffic. Security firm Blue Coat Systems 
discovered a malware that targets the device without using an 
installed app or APK (Android application package). This 
malware requires to visit a particular website and device gets 
infected as the malware takes advantages of various 
vulnerabilities in OS. This particular malware only affects 
devices, which have Android 4.0 through Android 4.3, but that 
still makes up for millions of Android phones out there and is 
more like ransomware. Whenever someone has been a victim, 
that person might look to anti-virus as a solution. However, 
anti-virus like Android defender are not actually real but some 
fake apps designed to cause harm. These apps have convincing 
GUI designed to fool user. Recent news report suggests, new 
President of USA uses an android device and experts believe 
this might lead big troubles to nation as android is prone to lot 
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 of security issues [2]. DHS provides several apps to the US 
citizens. Since many of these apps might be storing confidential 
user information, it is imperative that they are not accessible to 
other vulnerable or insecure applications as well as attackers. 
To ensure this, it is necessary to vet any app installed on a phone 
which has such confidential user information stored on it [3]. 
These problems can be addressed by performing Taint 
analyses on developing or developed application; it can analyze 
application both statically and dynamically. While static 
analysis imposes no run-time overhead, it is inherently 
imprecise. In contrast, dynamic taint-tracking, which uses taint 
tags to track whether a value contains private information has 
been shown to be effective at detecting personal privacy 
violations. For example, TaintDroid can track taints in real-time 
with a mere 14% performance overhead. As a result, TaintDroid 
gains great popularity among mobile device users [4]. 
The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section II gives 
overview of android architecture and security. Section III 
describes in brief various tools available at ones disposal. In 
Section IV comparison through experiments of some common 
tools is presented.  
II. ANDROID, SECURITY THREATS & FEATURES  
A. Android Overview 
The overall Android system architecture is shown in the Fig. 
1. Architecture has four main layers, providing services for the 
layer above and using services of the layer below. Android OS 
built on Linux kernel, allows being ported to various platforms 
with the help of hardware abstraction. Android native libraries 
in C or C++ are compiled by particular hardware architecture 
used by the device and lie above Linux kernel. Android consists 
of Dalvik Virtual Machine (DVM) and core Java libraries. 
Application framework layer enables control of lifecycle of an 
application, shares data between applications, provides a 
geographic location using GPS and manages notification. The 
uppermost layer consists of application and widget. 
Android has a cohesive approach to application 
development for mobile devices allowing the developed 
application to run on different devices driven by Android. 
Android applications can be considered the main source of the 
attack. Even precisely written application can be a source of 
malicious activity such as a leak of sensitive or private data, in 
form of messages, contacts, location, etc. 
B. Security Threats  
The growing popularity of smartphones, charms attention of 
cybercriminals who try to seize this opportunity in their hand for 
information and money. Latest OSes have been designed 
keeping in mind the security, so the easiest path for an attack is 
malware. Cybercriminals are now using attacks and techniques 
initially targeted at desktop users in the mobile channel. They 
are experts at social engineering and are executing targeted spear 
phishing attacks. Android devices are under attack by 
cybercriminals mostly because of [5]: 
• App side-loading (allow third-party apps to be installed) 
• Hacking an Android device is easy for cybercriminals 
• Weak rules governing app signing 
The vulnerability is a weakness in a system that aids 
attackers in the successful execution of threat or exploits and 
Risk is threat times vulnerability (potential loss/damage because 
of threat exploitation using vulnerability). Threat modeling 
allows to analyze the security of the application and it helps in 
understanding entry points and respective threats associated 
with them. STRIDE is a threat model used to identify threats and 
categorize them. Table I describes model for mobile along with 
categorized threats. The attacks on smartphones can be 
distinguised as [6] [7]:  
1) Malware: Malware or malicious software, designed to 
target the device such as a smartphone with the intention 
to damage or disrupt it and can be grouped into categories 
like a virus, worm, Trojan, rootkits, etc. It attacks the 
device without users consent. Symptoms like crashing, 
problems connecting to network, modified or deleted files 
gives presence of malware. 
2) Grayware: Grayware refers to applications that are not 
classified as viruses or Trojan-horse programs, but can 
still negatively affect the performance of the system and 
introduce significant security risks to the organization. 
Often grayware performs a variety of undesired actions 
such as irritating users with pop-ups, tracking user habits 
and unnecessarily exposing vulnerabilities to attack. 
3) Spyware: Spyware collects user information and sends to 
its developer/attacker. It usually hides itself from the user 
and it gets downloaded from ‘free downloads’ and doesn’t 
even ask for users permission to install. Software such as 
Adware can be categorized in spyware. 
HTTP protocol is used for communication and in few cases 
use of C&C via Google Cloud is observed. In-built SMS 
functionality can also be used. Once malware gains access to 
device, it can harm in one or many of following ways [8]:  
 
Fig. 1 Android Architecture 
TABLE I. STRIDE THREAT MODEL
Threat Definition Property 
Spoofing Impersonating user Authentication
Tampering Modifying data or code  Integrity
Repudiation Perform action which is 
not attributable 
Non-Repudiation
Information 
Disclosure 
Expose information to 
unauthorized person 
Confidentiality
Denial of Service Deny access to valid 
users 
Availability
Elevation of 
Privilege 
Gain access without 
proper authority 
Authorization
 • wipe device 
• reset lock screen PIN 
• open an arbitrary URL in the phone’s browser 
• send an SMS message to any or all contacts 
• lock or unlock the device 
• steal received SMS messages 
• steal contacts 
• display a different ransom message 
• enable or disable mobile data 
• track user’s GPS location 
 Google’s Play Store is a digital platform for distribution of 
Android application(s). According to experts, Google Play is not 
a well-policed platform and is one of main source of vulnerable 
application. Malware is known to be located in free app or free 
version of commercial apps on third-party app stores. The user 
is lured into installing the application that has malicious 
contents. For example, advertisements running through an 
application can be used to lure users into installing malicious 
applications. These risks can be more aggravated because of 
Android’s fragmentation of devices and OS. Once Google 
releases a version of OS, manufacture or carriers may not 
upgrade their OSes or may take some time for upgradation, 
hence a device may run on an unstable version of OS having 
security issues. If device runs on older version of OS, which 
means certain vulnerabilities will remain unpatched leaving an 
area for an attacker to exploit.  
Android’s open market policy makes it easy to access the 
app from alternate markets besides Play Store. These markets 
have a weak background check on app issuers or developers. 
There even exists a way to install the application without the use 
of app stores; it can be done with the help of “adb tool” when 
the device is connected to the computer. These give the user 
more freedom to install apps from non-market sources, but it 
opens up an additional entry point for malware.  Android apps 
are relatively easier to reverse-engineer compared to native apps 
in a desktop environment, such as Windows and UNIX 
executables, because hardware independent Dalvik bytecode 
files retain a great deal of information of the original Java 
sources. Android applications lack runtime ICC (inter-
component communication) control for purposes like (i). 
Prevent app from intercepting intent broadcast and possibly 
stopping its propagation afterward, (ii) to prevent the app from 
accessing any open interfaces of another app and to isolate apps 
and (iii) prevent them from communicating via ICC and other 
shared channels. JNI (Java Native Interface) can be used to 
invoke an app, this cause bug issues or memory corruption at 
low-level languages. There can also be issues with pre-installed 
apps and manufacturer’s customization. 
A software that will download and display ads when the user 
is online is known as an Adware. They collect user information 
without the knowledge of the user and share the collected 
information with advertising agencies. SDKs are offered by Ad 
networks which developer can embed into their application; this 
application will make use of IMSI and IMEI of the device to 
identify it to the server and share vital data. Trojans such as info 
stealers gather confidential information by monitoring internet 
activities for banking and social media activities. Spy phone 
apps can be used to spy on phone’s owner. They track the 
phone’s location, monitor incoming and outgoing calls, text 
messages, email and track the victim’s browsing. SMS Trojan 
can send text messages from compromised phone to other 
premium SMS numbers for which phone’s owner has to pay. 
Android allows installation of app from third-party source, 
which can be potentially harmful to the device, its user or user 
data. Potentially Harmful Applications (PHAs) attacks can range 
from data collection for targeted advertisement to potentially 
driven attacks for users’ harm. Information Extraction is a 
possible attack. Applications can have access to IMEI number 
through API calls if the application has proper rights. More or 
less you can get IMEI numbers are available in black markets. 
Many vendors provide features to their consumers like free 
calling and SMS, but some few services are premium. An 
attacker can easily make use of these services, make calls or send 
SMS to such premium numbers and the consumer or user has to 
pay for it. An example of an app is Fakeplayer [9]. Search 
Engine Optimization another form attack, which uses fraudulent 
clicks on the target website. The attacker can use users’ device 
to rise a particular website in search results. One of loop hole in 
Android security is that Android application can be seen 
downloading payloads or executable comprising of native codes 
or libraries for code execution. It can be possible for an attacker 
to make the malicious code available instead of original native 
code. Users can be seen customizing their devices to gain certain 
access to resources by rooting the device. Both genuine users 
and malware attackers carry out Root exploits. Malwares are 
granted privileges with the help of exploits such as Exploid and 
Zimperlich [9]. 
C. Security Features 
The Android application makes use of cutting-edge 
software and hardware along with local and served data to bring 
invention and significance to the user. The platform must offer 
an application with a secure environment, which guarantees the 
security of users’ device, data, application, and network. The 
security system should not only reduce the probability of attack 
but also limit the impact of the successful attack. Flexibility and 
Adaptability features of Android OS makes it unique as 
compared to its competitors like Apple iOS. Android’s 
customizable feature makes it more insecure. Device vendors 
can make changes to the existing version of OS to suit their 
hardware specifications. Although being a great feature, it can 
be a source of malicious activity. Security features of Android 
include [5]: 
• Security at OS levels through Linux Kernel 
• Application Sandboxing 
• Inter-process communication security 
• Application signing 
• User application permissions 
The Linux system over the years itself has been researched 
for vulnerability, attacked upon and fixed by developers. Linux 
is used in many security sensitive applications being one of 
most stable and secure kernel. In Android, Linux is used as a 
base for mobile computing environment and provides features 
such as permissions model, process isolation. Android does not 
allow one application to use resources of another application. 
This is done by giving each application a unique user id (UID), 
and application is run as a separate process. This sets up kernel-
level application sandbox. The key components of Android 
Security Program include [5]: 
• Design Review: The engineering and security resources 
review each feature, in order to test the outcome of 
previous activity or lifecycle. 
• Penetration Testing and Code Review: It has to be 
carried out during the development of the app to identify 
weakness and vulnerability. 
• Open source and community review: Android being 
open source any third party can review the app and give 
a response back to Google on the forum. 
 • Incident Response: After the report of a certain bug, 
Android has a response that enables rapid mitigation of 
threats to ensure the security of users. 
• Monthly security updates: Regular and secure update to 
ensure the security of applications. 
Taking inspiration from tools mentioned in section III, 
Google developed its security mechanisms for application 
security known as Bouncer [10]. Before the application is 
published on the Google Play, the application has to undergo a 
review process to verify that, app complies with policies of 
Google Play. Google provides security services that are 
automatically included as part of GMS (Google Mobile 
Services). The services include cloud-based services and on-
device services. These services showed a record of protecting 
around 1 billion mobile devices in 2015. On-devices services 
include Verify Apps (Protection from PHA), Safety Net 
(Protection from network and application based threats), 
Android Device Manager (Protection from lost and stolen 
devices), Safebrowsing (protect from unsafe websites), Smart 
Lock (Improve user authentication and physical protection). 
Cloud-based services involve Static & Dynamic Analysis, 
Third Party Reports, Signatures, and so on along with the use 
of various algorithms to see patterns and make connections that 
a human could not. 
III. APPLICATION SECURITY ANALYSIS 
Android application has two major sources: pre-installed 
applications and user installed applications. Android phones 
come with a bunch of pre-installed applications such as phone, 
calendar, email, contacts, etc. which provide a base for other 
applications. The user can install third-party applications 
because of open source development. Android has three types of 
applications: Native, Hybrid, and The Web. Native apps are built 
for particular devices, and coded in languages like JAVA. They 
can take full advantage of device features like camera, contacts, 
GPS. Web apps are not a real application but are websites that 
look like native apps. They run in browsers and written in 
HTML. Hybrid apps are part native and web apps. They can take 
advantage of device features like native apps and rely on HTML 
being rendered in the browser. Android application distributed 
from any source is in form of APK file. APK archive typically 
contents following directories and files: 
• META-INF directory 
• lib (directory having compiled code) 
• res (contains resources) 
• assets (containing application assets) 
• AndroidManifest.xml (name, version, etc. of app) 
• classes.dex (classes compiled in des file format) 
• resources.arsc (precompiled resources) 
 Android is a component–based system and makes use of 
ICC, in which component can interact with one another with 
help of intent. Four kinds of components a developer can define: 
UI of app is implemented by Activity component, broadcasting 
message component to component is handled by Broadcast 
Receiver, background tasks performed by services and providers 
define a database like storage. In android app the components 
are invoked through callback method (‘main’ method does not 
exist in android app). Target of ICC is explicitly defined in intent 
or is implicit and decided at runtime. 
A. Static Analysis 
Detecting and stopping threats discussed in Section II is a 
difficult task. Even though one follows the specific guidelines 
for designing an application, there is no guarantee that it will be 
safe. Static Analysis can be used as a tool to detect threats and 
rectify them. In static analysis, the application’s code or source 
code is analyzed for any malicious activity without requiring its 
execution. Static Analysis involves extracting information from 
packaged apk’s viz. source code needs to be extracted from apk. 
DroidMat, dex2jar, Procyon, etc. are the tools used for 
developing a proper tool for analysis. Recent years has shown 
advancement in static analysis, but these are not precise enough 
to use in practice. Android application run within the Android 
framework, this creates imposing of complex lifecycle on the 
apps, invoking call-back methods pre-defined or user-defined 
different times during execution of app. The tool must predict 
apps control flow and hence requires precise lifecycle 
modeling. Imprecise lifecycle modeling will cause the tool to 
lose or overshadow important data flows. Static Analysis tools 
have several approaches depending upon precision, runtime, 
scope, and focus. 
CHEX [11] a tool to detect component hijacking 
vulnerabilities in the app, is considered as most sophisticated. 
It tracks taints between externally accessible interfaces and 
sensitive source or sink. Communication-based vulnerabilities 
can be detected using ComDroid [9, 12]. The tool analyzes 
Dalvik executable files, performs flow-sensitive 
intraprocedural analysis and examines app for permissions. 
SCandroid [9] a tool for generating automated security 
certification for the app using data flow analysis. Androwarn a 
tool for detection and warning user of malicious activities such 
as telephony service abuse, geolocation information leak, 
Denial of Service, etc. QARK (Quick Android Review Kit) is a 
tool having the capacity to find a common vulnerability in 
Android app. It is different from most of the traditional tools; it 
will point at vulnerabilities along with its feature of adb 
commands. QARK attempts to find, Weak or improper 
cryptography use, Improper x.509 certificate validation, 
Activities which may leak data, Sending of insecure Broadcast 
Intents,   Insecurely created Pending Intents and many more 
security vulnerabilities. 
FlowDroid [12] the first fully context, object and flow 
sensitive analysis. It analyzes apps bytecode and configuration 
files to find leaks. It is used to identify data loss caused by either 
carelessness or malicious intent. Amandroid [13] takes 
inspiration from FlowDroid; their model extends FlowDroid by 
capturing control and data dependencies among components. 
Flow of Amandroid includes conversion of apps Dalvik 
bytecode to intermediate representation, generate environment 
model, build inter-component data flow (IDFG), build data 
dependence graph (DDG) and then it applies security detection. 
Amandroid can be used for data leak detection, data injection 
detection and API misuse. DidFail (Droid Intent Data Flow 
Analysis for Information Leakage) combines and augments 
FlowDroid and Epicc (which identifies properties of intents 
such as its action string) to detect leaks within a set of Android 
apps. FlowDroid is extended by IccTA to analyze inter-
component dataflow. LeakSemantic [14] is a hybrid static-
dynamic analysis approach, to locate subtle network 
transmissions in apps.  Agrigento [15], a new approach that is 
resilient to such obfuscations and, in fact, to any arbitrary 
transformation performed on the private information before it 
 is leaked. It works by performing differential black-box 
analysis on Android apps. MamaDroid [16], an Android 
malware detection system based on modeling the sequences of 
API calls as Markov chains. The system is designed to operate 
in one of two modes, with different granularities, by abstracting 
API calls to either families or packages. HornDroid [17], a tool 
for the static analysis of Android applications based on Horn 
clause resolution. HornDroid is the first static analysis tool for 
Android that comes with a formal proof of soundness covering 
a large fragment of the Android ecosystem.  
B. Dynamic Analysis 
Dynamic analysis (Dynamic dataflow analysis) of an 
application involves testing and evaluation by feeding data to 
the application in real time within a controlled environment. It 
is used to analyze and monitor the situation behind the scenes 
while the application is running. Although static analysis tools 
are quick, they fail against encrypted, polymorphic and code 
transformed malware. Android app interaction is based upon UI 
elements and unsynchronized entry points; it is important to 
trigger to these events and elements to understand behavior. 
Android SDK is equipped with monkey runner, to automate 
gestures like swipe, key press, tap, etc. 
TaintDroid [18] provides system-wide taint tracking for 
Android. It identifies data originating from sensitive sources 
like IMEI, camera, and GPS and monitors all network interfaces 
for sensitive data leak. Since Android L, TaintDroid can handle 
Android ART runtime. ARTDroid [19] could be extended to 
implement the dynamic taint analysis in the ART runtime in the 
future. ARTDroid is a hooking framework on Android ART 
runtime without modifications to both the Android system and 
the app’s code. The effectiveness of dynamic dataflow depends 
on factors such as sink and source definition and input 
generation & test-driving. VetDroid [19] considers automation 
of source/sinks. It marks the information returned by functions 
calls backed by permissions. It means, it leverages the 
predefined Android permissions for automation. Machine 
learning techniques are used by SuSi to automatically identify 
sources/sinks in android APIs. Capper [20] instruments app 
instead of Android system for incorporating taint tracking. It 
has byte code rewriting approach to insert code in original one 
to keep track of data leakage. DroidScope [9] uses virtual 
TABLE III.          DROIDBENCH TEST RESULTS
O = TRUE POSITIVE, * = FALSE POSITIVE, X= FALSE NEGATIVE [13] [14] 
App Name Flowdroid Amandroid
QARK 
Warnings
Arrays Lists 
ArrayAccess1 * * * 3 
ArrayAccess2 * * * 3 
ListAccess1 * * * 3 
Callbacks 
AnonymousClass1 O O O 3 
Button1 O O O 3 
Button2 OOO* OOO O 3 
LocationLeak1 OO OO O 3 
LocationLeak2 OO OO O 3 
MethodOverride1 O O* O 3 
Field and Object Sensitivity 
FieldSensitivity3 O O O 3 
InheritedObjects1 O O O 3 
Inter-App Communication 
IntentSink1 X O * 4 
IntentSink2 O O O 3 
ActivityCommunication1 O X O 3 
Lifecycle 
BroadcastreceiverLifecycl
e1 
O O O 3 
ActivityLifecycle1 O O O 3 
ActivityLifecycle2 O O O 3 
ActivityLifecycle3 O O O 3 
ActivityLifecycle4 O O O 3 
ServiceLifecycle1 O O O 2 
General JAVA 
Loop1 O O O 3 
Loop2 O O O 3 
SourceCodeSpecific1  O O O 3 
StaticInitialization1 X O O 3 
Miscellaneous Android-Specific 
PrivateDataLeak1 O O O 3 
PrivateDataLeak2 O O O 3 
DirectLeak1 O O O 3 
Implicit Flows 
ImplicitFlow1 XX XX X 3 
ImplicitFlow2 XX XX X 3 
ImplicitFlow3 XX XX X 3 
ImplicitFlow4 XX XX X 3 
Sum, Precision and Recall - DroidBench 
O, higher is better 26 27 23 
*, lower is better 4 4 4 
X, lower is better 10 9 4 
Precision p = O/(O + *) 86% 87% 85% 
Recall r = O/(O + X) 72% 75% 85% 
F-measure 2pr/( p + r) 0.78 0.81 0.85 
TABLE II.            OPEN SOURCE AVAILABILITY OF TOOLS [26] [20] [25]
Method Tool Open Source (Publicly available) 
Static Analysis 
CHEX No 
SCandroid Yes 
Flowdroid Yes 
Amandroid Yes 
QARK Yes 
ComDroid No 
Agrigento Yes 
HornDroid Yes 
LeakSemantic No 
Mamadroid No 
Dynamic Analysis 
ARTDroid Yes 
VetDroid No 
DroidScope Yes 
CopperDroid No 
Machine Learning 
approach 
DroidScribe No 
StormDroid No 
RevealDroid Yes 
Real-time 
Monitoring 
ARTist No 
TaintDroid Yes 
AppsPlayground Yes 
Andromaly No 
Testing (GUI) 
Sapienz Yes 
Dynodroid Yes 
Collider No 
 machine introspection to mirror the three levels of an Android 
device: hardware, OS and Dalvik Virtual Machine facilitating 
the collection of detailed native and Dalvik instruction traces, 
profile API-level activity, etc. AASandbox executes the app in 
an isolated sandbox environment to analyze low-level 
interactions with the system. AntiMalDroid to detect Android 
malware that uses logged behavior sequence as the feature, and 
construct the models for further detecting malware and its 
variants effectively in runtime. CopperDroid [11] dynamically 
observe interactions between Android components and the 
underlying Linux system to reconstruct higher-level behavior. 
IV. RESULTS 
DroidBench [12] is an Android-specific test suite. In version 
2.0, 120 test cases are available and used to access both static 
and dynamic taint analysis problems, but in particularly has test 
cases for static analysis. Many have used DroidBench to 
measure and improve the effectiveness of their analysis tool. We 
compare the effectiveness of detecting data leakage of 
FlowDroid, AmanDroid and QARK tools and the results are in 
Table III. The results obtained are represented in terms of True 
Positive (O), False Positive (*), and False Negative (X). 
Multiple data leakages found can be represented in a single line, 
for example, Button2. QARK at present only supports LINUX 
environment but designers are working towards support for 
Windows. This tool can run in two modes, Scriptable mode and 
Interactive mode. Once an application apk is scanned for 
vulnerabilities the report is stored in html file in QARK directory 
(html file is re-written whenever tool is restarted or re-run for 
different apk). QARK represents it outcomes in form of potential 
vulnerability or warnings, illustrated as follows, 
‘POTENTIAL VULNERABILITY - Access of phone 
number or IMEI, is detected in file: 
/home/…DroidBenchmaster/apk/Callbacks/Button3/classes_de
x2jar/de/ecspride/Button1Listener.java.Avoid storing or 
transmitting this data’. 
This typical vulnerability was for the ‘Button3.apk’ in the 
suite. If tools is able to detect a potential vulnerability it was 
represented as O, *, and X, and the number of warnings are 
simultaneously shown in Table III. The experiments were 
carried out in interactive mode for at least three times so that any 
sort of error in testing is eliminated. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we discussed the threats and security features 
along with tools for application security analysis. Android 
allows installation of third-party apks, which can be potentially 
harmful to the device, its user or user data. Attacks can range 
from data collection for targeted advertisement to potentially 
driven attacks for user-harm. Android requires additional 
security enforcements even if it has the presence of security 
features like user permissions, security at kernel level, and 
inter-process communication security. The two type of 
analyses, analyze source code as well as record the run-time 
behavior of application. We tested the performance of three 
static analysis tools using DroidBench including FlowDroid, 
AmanDroid and QARK. A comparison was presented which 
indicated that Amandroid has the highest precision rate (87%) 
while the highest recall vale of QARK (85%) resulted in overall 
highest f-measure value for QARK (0.85). 
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